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The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk 
Exception* 
Lee Davison* * 
Abstract 
In the fall of 2008, short-term credit markets were all but frozen, creating 
liquidity issues for banks and bank holding companies that could not 
rollover their debt at reasonable rates. Fearing that the situation would 
worsen if something was not done, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board invoked, and the 
Secretary of the Treasury approved, the use of the “systemic risk 
exception” (SRE) under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991, to provide unprecedented broad-based relief 
to struggling banks. The SRE permitted the FDIC to depart from its “least-
cost” requirement when addressing failing banks. Under the auspices of 
the SRE, the FDIC implemented two programs: (1) the Debt Guarantee 
Program (DGP), which extended the FDIC’s guarantee to newly issued 
debt instruments of FDIC-insured institutions, their holding companies, 
and their eligible affiliates; and (2) the Transaction Account Guarantee 
Program (TAGP), which provided unlimited deposit insurance coverage 
of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts. The DGP and TAGP were 
integral parts of a broad government response to systemic risk in the 
banking system and are considered successful elements thereof. Under 
the DGP, at peak usage, the FDIC guaranteed approximately $350 billion 
in newly issued bank debt. Under the TAGP, at peak usage, the FDIC 
guaranteed approximately $800 billion in non-interest-bearing 
transaction accounts at participating banks, offering for the first-time 
insurance over the statutory amount. The fees collected for the programs 
exceeded any losses covered by the government.
 
* This article originally appeared as Chapter 2 in Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 
2008-2013, 33-65; we have retained the footnotes and bibliography as originally 
formatted. Crisis and Response examines in detail the causes of the financial crisis, the 
particular impacts on banks and their related entities, and the FDIC’s unprecedented and 
multifaceted response during which it implemented new and innovative solutions. The 
complete volume is available without charge from the FDIC’s website at 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/. 
** Historian, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This article does not necessarily 
reflect the views of the FDIC. 
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Introduction 
During the unprecedented financial-market disruptions in the United 
States and abroad in the fall of 2008, government officials took 
extraordinary measures to calm market fears and encourage lending. 
One of these measures was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 
(FDIC) Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). The TLGP had 
two components. It provided a limited-term guarantee for certain newly 
issued debt not only of banks and thrifts but also of bank, thrift, and 
financial holding companies and eligible bank affiliates (the Debt 
Guarantee Program, or DGP). Additionally, the TLGP fully guaranteed 
certain non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts (the 
Transaction Account Guarantee Program, or TAGP). 
During the first half of October 2008, U.S. policymakers made the 
decision to implement these programs and achieved consensus both 
about the mechanism for creating them and about the policy trade-offs 
involved in their design. During this same short period, the FDIC worked 
to ensure that the two voluntary programs would be in place at the time 
of their announcement on October 14, and during the last months of 
2008, the FDIC refined the programs to increase their effectiveness. 
Of the approximately 14,000 entities eligible to participate in the DGP, 
about half opted into the program (though almost all the debt 
guaranteed was issued by fewer than 50 such entities), and a significant 
majority of eligible institutions signed on to the TAGP. At their height, the 
DGP guaranteed almost $350 billion in outstanding debt and the TAGP 
covered over $800 billion in deposits. The programs were designed in 
such a way that expected fees would cover potential losses, but as it 
turned out, the fees charged to participating entities far outstripped the 
losses attributable to the TLGP as a  whole.1 The DGP ended on October 31, 
2009, a year after its introduction (though guaranteed debt remained 
outstanding until 2012). The TAGP, after two extensions, ended on 
December 31, 2010. The TLGP proved effective in stabilizing financial 
markets, with the DGP reopening frozen debt markets to participating 
entities and the TAGP stabilizing deposit funding for insured depository 
institutions.  
 
1 If the TLGP’s fees had been insufficient to cover losses, a systemic risk assessment 
would have been levied on all insured institutions (see the section below titled “The 
TLGP: Effects and Costs”). 
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The Policy Debate in October 2008 
With financial markets in turmoil, governments around the world sought 
to formulate and coordinate responses designed to return stability to 
those markets. In the United States and many other countries, the 
responses involved guaranteeing debt issued by banks and expanding 
deposit insurance coverage. In the United States, these two courses of 
action occasioned a policy debate among financial regulators, leading to 
the decision to use the systemic risk exception under the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 as the 
mechanism for providing the debt guarantees and the increased deposit 
insurance coverage. The box titled “The Systemic Risk Exception: 
Origins, Definition, and Procedure” provides background on the 
systemic risk exception. 
The G7’s Response to the Financial Crisis: Implications for the United 
States 
Faced with badly deteriorating conditions in financial markets, the 
Group of Seven finance ministers met in Washington, DC, and developed 
a plan to address these problems, focusing on liquidity, capital, and 
market stability. The plan was announced on October 8, 2008, and one of 
its goals was to “take all necessary steps to unfreeze credit and money 
markets and ensure that banks and other financial institutions have 
broad access to liquidity and funding.” To achieve this goal, the 
governments of many advanced economies decided to guarantee debt 
issued by banks and other financial institutions, and to expand deposit 
insurance guarantees. 
Given the frozen credit and money markets and the need to coordinate 
 
 See G7 Finance Ministers, “G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Plan 
of Action,” October 10, 2008, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm081010.htm. 
The members of the Group of Seven are the United States, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 
 In addition to the program in the United States, some form of debt guarantee was 
put in place in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. See Sebastian Schich, “Expanded Government Guarantees for Bank 
Liabilities: Selected Issues,” OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2009, no. 1, 5, 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/42779438.pdf. For the expansion 
of deposit insurance coverage internationally, see International Association of 
Deposit Insurers, “Discussion Paper on Cross Border Deposit Insurance Issues Raised 
by the Global Financial Crisis,” March 2011, 13–15, 
http://www.iadi.org/en/assets/File/Papers/Approved%20Research%20-
%20Discussion%20Papers/IADI_CBDI_Paper_29_ 
Mar_2011_(Final_for_publication).pdf. 
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with the international response to the financial crisis, the United States 
had to determine what mechanism was appropriate for guaranteeing 
bank debt. The U.S. Treasury Department (Treasury) later stated that if 
the United States were not to take actions similar to those being 
undertaken in Europe, “global market participants might turn to 
institutions and markets in countries where the perceived protections 
were the greatest.” 
The Policy Response by U.S. Financial Regulators 
For approximately ten days in October, primarily over the weekend of 
October 11 and 12, senior officials from the FDIC, the Federal Reserve 
System, and Treasury debated how to respond to the paralysis 
throughout the credit markets. These officials had to reach agreement 
on what mechanism, if any, would be appropriate for guaranteeing bank 
debt, if any, and they had to agree on the extent of a transaction account 
guarantee. Guaranteeing bank debt was seen as the more consequential 
of the two actions, for two reasons. First, large banks needed access to the 
debt markets, and needed it right away. Second, guaranteeing bank debt 
would be an unprecedented foray into a type of guarantee that was totally 
new for the FDIC, whereas extending the deposit guarantee would be an 
incremental change. 
Underpinning the need to agree on the mechanism for guaranteeing 
bank debt and on the details for extending deposit coverage was the need 
to choose the resources that would stand behind these guarantees. The 
FDIC’s resources would clearly back insured deposits, but the debt 
guarantee was more problematic. One possible channel of funds was an 
appropriation by Congress. However, policymakers believed that 
Congress would not authorize funds over and above those it had—most 
 
 U.S. GAO, Federal Deposit Insurance Act: Regulators’ Use of Systemic Risk Exception 
Raises Moral Hazard Concerns and Opportunities Exist to Clarify the Provision, GAO-10-
100, 2010, 18, http://www.gao.gov/ products/GAO-10-100. For discussion of the 
scope and design of foreign debt-guarantee programs, often in comparison with the 
U.S. program, see Schich, “Expanded Government Guarantees”; Fabio Panetta et al., 
“An Assessment of Financial Sector Rescue Programmes,” BIS Papers 48, 2009, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/ bppdf/bispap48.pdf; Aviram Levy and Sebastian Schich, 
“The Design of Government Guarantees for Bank Bonds: Lessons from the Recent 
Financial Crisis, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2010, no. 1, 
https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/45636972.pdf; Aviram Levy and 
Andrea Zaghini, “The Pricing of Government-Guaranteed Bank Bonds,” Banks and 
Bank Systems 6, no. 3 (2011), https://businessperspectives. 
org/media/zoo/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/js/pdfjs/web/41
26; and Giuseppe Grande et al., “Public Guarantees on Bank Bonds: Effectiveness and 
Distortions,” OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2011, no. 2, 47–72, 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/49200208.pdf. 
4
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 1 Iss. 2
  
 
reluctantly—just provided to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
Policymakers also considered TARP itself an unlikely source of funding 
for the debt guarantee. In addition, they believed that the Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB) had no authority to guarantee bank debt directly. In their 
view, the only available method of providing broad guarantees of bank 
debt (and the only way to expand deposit insurance coverage without 
congressional action) was to use the systemic risk exception (SRE), 
which allowed open-bank assistance through the FDIC. 
The Systemic Risk Exception: Origins, Definition, and 
Procedure 
The roots of the SRE can be found in concerns that FDIC 
resolutions during the banking crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s 
had frequently protected uninsured depositors and creditors in 
addition to insured depositors. In February 1991, a 
congressionally mandated study of the deposit insurance system 
recommended that the FDIC should, in order to minimize the cost of 
resolving failed banks, seek to limit its protection to insured 
depositors whenever possible. To accomplish this goal, any failed-
bank resolution was to be undertaken at the least cost to the deposit 
insurance fund. The study noted, however, that “the presence of 
systemic risk could require a decision to protect uninsured 
depositors even if it is not the least costly resolution method.” 
Although the report acknowledged the FDIC’s practice of 
consulting both the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (FRB) and Treasury when it chose to protect uninsured 
depositors, the report stated that a systemic risk decision 
demanded “a broader government consensus that systemic risk 
exists and requires extraordinary government action” and 
recommended that the FRB and Treasury jointly make a systemic 
risk determination if they agreed on the need to protect uninsured 
depositors.a 
Congress incorporated the systemic risk determination into the 
 
 See Sheila Bair, Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and 
Wall Street from Itself (2012), 113; Timothy Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on 
Financial Crises (2014), 226; and Ben S. Bernanke, The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a 
Crisis and Its Aftermath (2015), 340. 
 The TLGP was not the only use of the systemic risk exception during the financial 
crisis. For its application in the cases of the individual financial institutions Wachovia, 
Citigroup, and Bank of America from September 2008 through January 2009, see FDIC 
2017, Chapter 3. 
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA), but amended the regulatory process that Treasury 
recommended.b  Unless the SRE was invoked, FDICIA prohibited 
protection for uninsured depositors and other creditors if 
protecting those depositors and creditors would increase a 
resolution’s cost to the deposit insurance fund. It also required that 
the decision to grant an SRE be made by the Secretary of the 
Treasury in consultation with the President, but only after a 
written recommendation by a two-thirds majority of both the 
FDIC Board of Directors and the FRB. After an SRE determination 
was made, the FDIC would be authorized to act or assist as 
necessary to avoid the potential adverse effects of a major-bank 
failure. The SRE was not used until 2008. 
a See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: U.S. 
Treasury Department Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks (1991), 
especially 27–28. 
b For policymakers’ views on the SRE as it was being considered, see Economic 
Implications of the “Too Big to Fail Policy,” Hearing Before the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, Committee on 
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 102nd Cong. (1991). 
By October 13, after days of intense negotiation, the agencies reached 
agreement on the basic elements of the emergency program to guarantee 
bank debt and insure a broad subset of transaction deposits. The 
agreement immediately set in motion the process of requesting a 
systemic risk determination, in keeping with the procedure set forth in 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991: 
the FDIC Board and the FRB voted to recommend a systemic risk 
exception to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary—after 
consulting with the President—quickly determined that a systemic risk 
existed. 
The resulting program—the two-part Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program (TLGP)—was announced on October 14 in a joint press 
conference by the FDIC, the U.S. Treasury Department, and the Federal 
Reserve. In announcing the program, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair 
emphasized that it was needed to stabilize the financial system and that 
it would be funded through fees charged to participating financial 
institutions, not taxpayers and not the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), 
which was intended to protect the deposits of bank customers.7 The 
 
7 See FDIC, “Statement by FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair,” FDIC Joint Press Conference 
with U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve, Press Release, October 14, 2008, 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100a.html. 
6
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 1 Iss. 2
  
 
TLGP was a crucial element of a three-part U.S. government response to 
the financial crisis. The other two parts were the Treasury’s capital 
injections into banks under the TARP, and the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility (CPFF) under the aegis of the FRB. The three programs 
were designed to work together. 
Policy Discussions: The Details of the TLGP 
To reach agreement about the details of the debt guarantee program, 
policymakers had to resolve several complex issues. One was whether 
to guarantee bank debt that was already outstanding. There was concern 
that such a broad guarantee might prove too large a liability to cover and 
might create a windfall for those institutions that had invested in bank 
debt, but arguments were also made that the guarantee needed to be as 
wide as possible. Another issue was whether to guarantee debt issued by 
bank holding companies (BHCs) and their nonbank affiliates. Some 
worries were expressed that there might have been legal impediments 
to guaranteeing such debt, and questions were raised about whether 
such a guarantee was in fact desirable. However, the view was also held 
that not guaranteeing debt issued by BHCs would leave U.S. banks at a 
competitive disadvantage since European debt guarantee programs 
would cover the debt issued by the large universal banks in those 
countries. A third area of debate was whether to assess a fee for 
guarantees, and a fourth was whether creditors should bear any loss on 
bonds whose issuers defaulted. On the question of fees charged to 
entities that would issue guaranteed debt, there was agreement that a 
fee should be assessed but a spectrum of opinion on how much the fee 
should be. Arguments were made for (1) a minimal fee to encourage 
participation, (2) a fee calibrated to replicate funding costs during normal 
market conditions, and (3) a fee that took into account the cost of 
potential defaults. As for creditors bearing loss if a bond issuer defaulted, 
an early proposal suggested that creditors bear a 10 percent loss on such 
bonds, but many policymakers viewed this as undercutting the purpose 
of the guarantee. 
In the end it was agreed that the debt guarantee program would cover 
only newly issued debt and for a limited range of maturities. BHC debt 
would be covered, but with a limitation on thrift holding companies’ 
 
 For an overview of the CPFF, see Tobias Adrian et al., “The Federal Reserve’s 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic 
Policy Review, May 2011, 25–39. 
 This discussion is based on Bair, Bull by the Horns, 109–20; Geithner, Stress Test, 
226–38; and Bernanke, The Courage to Act, 339–42. 
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ability to participate in the debt guarantee program and with the 
proviso that the FDIC would approve applications for guarantees of 
debt issued by nonbank affiliates of BHCs on a case-by-case basis. These 
restrictions were necessitated by the large number of thrift holding 
companies and BHC affiliates and the attendant difficulty in assessing 
the risk to the FDIC from guaranteeing their debt. The costs to program 
participants would be low but meaningful, and creditors would not face 
a loss on bonds whose issuers defaulted. 
To reach agreement on the expansion of deposit insurance coverage, 
policymakers had to decide whether to expand deposit insurance 
coverage beyond what the FDIC already offered and, if so, to what 
extent. Bank deposits were an important form of liquidity for many 
smaller banks, and such banks faced risk from potential runs by entities 
holding deposits above the insurance limit, such as small businesses 
and municipalities. To forestall such runs, the FDIC had argued several 
weeks earlier that the agency should extend an unlimited guarantee to 
transaction accounts at banks, believing that such a guarantee would 
promote public confidence in banks, but at that time the proposal for 
such a guarantee was not adopted. It was later noted that there had 
been a general opposition to such an expansion of deposit insurance 
because of moral hazard, but that during the crisis, expansion of the 
insurance guarantee was thought to be warranted because, without it, 
there could be rapid deposit outflows from smaller banks into banks 
that were perceived to be too big to fail. 
In the end, the proposal for an unlimited guarantee of transaction 
accounts at banks was agreed to as part of the TLGP. The policymakers 
therefore ended up striking a balance among their varying views on 
providing these two forms of assistance to the financial system. 
The Case for a Systemic Risk Exception 
At the same time that these policy discussions were being held, FDIC 
staff was gathering data and other information to support the case for 
a systemic risk exception. The information was assembled in a 
memorandum that the FDIC Board would consider before voting on the 
issue.10 The memorandum documented the growing and 
unprecedented disruption in credit markets and the concomitant 
effects on banks’ ability to obtain funding and to extend credit. Banks 
had responded to the crisis by retaining cash and tightening lending 
 
10 This section is largely based on that memo: FDIC, “Memorandum to the Board of 
Directors: FDIC Guarantee of Bank Debt,” October 13, 2008. For further discussion of 
the events and trends during the second half of 2008, see FDIC 2017, Chapter 1. 
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standards. Borrowing by businesses, households, and state and local 
governments had slowed significantly, and the trend was likely to 
continue. The interbank market as defined by the TED (Treasury-
Eurodollar) spread was normally stable at just below 25 basis points 
(bps), but the spread had been rising significantly since 2007; by 
August 2008 the spread had risen to 238 bps, and by October 9, to 415 
bps (see Figure 2.1). At this level almost no interbank lending was 
taking place, and banks had ceased lending in the federal funds 
market.11 
Figure 2.1. Interbank Lending Spreads, December 2006–December 2010 
  
 
11 The federal funds market allowed commercial banks that had excess reserves on 
deposit at regional Federal Reserve banks to lend those funds to financial institutions 
that had liquidity needs. 
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In addition, since Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., filed for bankruptcy, 
on September 15, even creditworthy companies had been having 
difficulty successfully issuing commercial paper, especially at longer 
maturities, and any debt that was being issued carried extremely high 
interest rates even for very short-term instruments. Securitization 
markets for both residential and commercial mortgage-backed 
securities had essentially shut down, and issuances of other types of 
asset-backed securities had also fallen drastically. Flight to safety had 
greatly increased Treasury “fails” (the failure to deliver Treasury 
securities), demonstrating both increased demand for U.S. government 
securities and the scarcity of these securities. 
Short-term funding markets in particular were essentially frozen, and 
in this environment many banks and BHCs found it hard to replace 
funding at a reasonable cost. The short-term funding channels that 
were normally available to financial institutions had become 
problematic and expensive, when they were available at all. Figure 2.2 
shows the unusual length of time during which almost no bank senior 
unsecured debt was issued after the Lehman bankruptcy. Had the TLGP 
not been implemented, that situation could have continued. 
In addition, the FDIC had examined the effect that a 5-percent run on 
uninsured deposits would have on economic activity and found that a 
stressed environment could reduce GDP growth by nearly 2 percent 
per year, a reduction that could either create or prolong a recession.12 
Although no evidence suggested that such a large run was happening, 
uninsured deposits were leaving banks that were perceived to be 
troubled, and the FDIC had anecdotal evidence that even healthy banks 
were experiencing deposit outflows. 
 
12 See 73 Fed. Reg. 64180 (Oct. 29, 2008). 
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Figure 2.2. Trends in Senior Unsecured U.S. Bank Debt Issuance before 
and after September 2008
 
The Systemic Risk Exception Reinterpreted 
Before the 2008 crisis, policymakers and industry observers generally 
thought that FDICIA’s systemic risk exception was intended to apply to 
an individual troubled institution. The situation that policymakers 
were confronting in 2008, however, involved not only the possible 
failure of a single institution, or even of a single market, but dysfunction 
throughout much of the financial system. These circumstances led 
policymakers to reexamine the scope of the systemic risk exception.  
Their rationale for viewing the systemic risk exception as appropriate 
in this set of conditions was, first, that the intent of the proposed two-
part TLGP was to mitigate the effects of credit market disruption and 
lessen the losses to the FDIC that would likely result from inaction. 
Second, safeguards were built into the two component programs: the 
guarantees would be limited in duration and scope; the programs 
would be industry funded, with a fee structure that was expected to 
protect the DIF; and the participating institutions would be subject to 
careful oversight. Finally, the total proposed program was integral to 
the overall three-part U.S. response to systemic risk in the banking 
system (as noted above, the other two parts were the Treasury’s TARP 
capital infusions and the Federal Reserve’s CPFF). 
11
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The FDIC’s Board of Directors, while unanimously approving the 
systemic risk exception and strongly supporting the TLGP, was well 
aware that the agency was heading into new territory: then Vice 
Chairman Martin Gruenberg remarked that “this action being proposed 
today…is perhaps the most extraordinary ever taken by an FDIC 
Board.” Given the innovative nature of the action, House and Senate 
leaders had been consulted in advance about the steps the regulatory 
agencies were going to take, and their support was obtained. More than 
one Board member observed that Congress would need to examine the 
statutory framework of the systemic risk exception to see if the 
exception as originally conceived was adequate to cover circumstances 
not foreseen in 1991, when the law was written.13 The box titled 
Questions about the Statutory Authority for the TLGP” discusses the 
legal underpinnings for the guarantees provided by the FDIC under the 
new program. 
 
13 FDIC, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes (Oct. 13, 2008). 
Questions about the Statutory Authority for the TLGP 
In 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the use 
of the systemic risk exception in 2008–2009. The report noted that the 
height of the financial crisis was the first time the government had used the 
exception and that the TLGP was created at a time of “volatile economic 
circumstances.” 
The report went on to explain that the agencies (the FDIC, FRB, and 
Treasury) believed that FDICIA as drafted was unclear on how the systemic 
risk determination should be applied. Holding this belief, they thought the 
law’s provisions could be interpreted to allow a systemic risk determination 
when either the banking industry as a whole or just a single institution was 
in danger of causing the entire financial system to collapse. Moreover, the 
agencies believed that “a systemic risk determination waives all of the 
normal statutory restrictions on FDIC assistance, as well as creating new 
authority to provide assistance, both as to types of aid provided and as to the 
entities that may receive it.” Given these interpretations, the agencies chose 
to make what they called a “generic systemic risk determination.” They 
based their choice on two assumptions about bank-by-bank assistance: it 
would be ineffective, and it would be more costly to the FDIC than would the 
TLGP. 
The GAO acknowledged that it found some support for the agencies’ 
positions that the systemic risk exception could be used both to authorize 
12
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The Creation of the TLGP and Initial Participation 
The TLGP was a complex program that needed to be created quickly. 
Normally any FDIC program, let alone one entirely new for the agency, 
would go through a relatively long rulemaking process before being put 
in place. But because of the emergent nature of the financial crisis, the 
TLGP took effect as soon as it was announced, on October 14; the 
announcement was based on the FDIC’s best attempts to assemble an 
intricate program during the first two weeks in October. Immediately 
after announcing the two component programs of the TLGP, the FDIC 
briefed potential participants on how the Corporation expected the 
programs to work.14 
Just two weeks later, on October 29, the FDIC issued an interim final 
rule that elaborated on the broad outlines and specific elements 
previously presented, and at the same time the agency sought 
comments, though on a much more expedited schedule than usual.15 
The interim final rule was amended on November 7 (again with a 
request for comments), and the final rule was adopted on November 
21, only five weeks after the TLGP had been announced.16 Many of the 
comments helped improve the effectiveness of the program, 
 
14 The transcripts of the conference calls can be found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/archive.html. 
15 If an agency has enough reason to issue a final rule without first publishing a 
proposed rule, such a rule is often called an interim final rule; this kind of rule 
becomes effective on publication, but an agency may amend it later in response to 
public comments, as was the case with the TLGP interim final rule. 
16 See 73 Fed. Reg. 64179 (Oct. 29, 2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 66160 (Nov. 7, 2008); and 73 
Fed. Reg. 72244 (Nov. 26, 2008). 
the TLGP and to provide assistance of the scope that the TLGP provided, but 
the GAO also found that the agencies’ interpretations were open to question 
and raised significant policy issues. The report recommended that Congress 
clarify the statutory language about the requirements for, and assistance 
provided under, a systemic risk exception.   Congress revised the language 
as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
in July 2010 (see the conclusion of this paper). 
 
a For a detailed analysis, see U.S. GAO, Federal Deposit Insurance Act: 
Regulators’ Use of Systemic Risk Exception (2010), 43–57. 
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particularly the debt guarantee component, as a tool for bringing 
stability to the financial markets.17  
The TLGP was structured as a voluntary program. When it began, all 
eligible entities18 were automatically enrolled for the first 30 days at no 
cost, after which fees would be assessed to participants, and eligible 
entities would be allowed to opt out of either the Debt Guarantee 
Program (DGP) or the Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP) 
or both.19 To eliminate an adverse selection problem (only the weakest 
entities would opt in, while stronger ones would opt out), all entities 
within a holding company were required to make the same decision 
about the DGP. 
More than half of the over 14,000 eligible entities decided to remain in 
the DGP during its initial period (the DGP would later be extended 
beyond its initial period, as discussed below), and more than 7,100 
banks and thrifts, or 86 percent of FDIC-insured institutions, decided 
to remain in the TAGP. Most of the institutions that opted out of the DGP 
were those that had less than $1 billion in assets and issued no 
appreciable amount of senior unsecured debt. In addition, the FDIC 
placed restrictions on many entities’ participation in the DGP (see the 
next section for more detail). 
  
 
17 Some of the most significant changes made in response to comments were the 
following: the definition of senior unsecured debt was revised; an alternative cap was 
provided for banks that had either no senior unsecured debt outstanding or only fed 
funds purchased; the debt guarantee limits of a participating insured depository 
institution and its parent BHC were combined; the timely payment of principal and 
interest following payment default was guaranteed; and the transaction accounts 
guarantee was broadened to cover both Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTAs) 
and negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts. Many of these changes are 
discussed below in the sections on the DGP and the TAGP. 
18 Eligible entities were (1) an insured depository institution; (2) a U.S. bank holding 
company, provided that it controlled (directly or indirectly) at least one subsidiary 
that was a chartered and operating insured depository institution; (3) a U.S. savings 
and loan holding company (with certain limitations), provided that it controlled 
(directly or indirectly) at least one subsidiary that was a chartered and operating 
insured depository institution; and (4) any other affiliates of an insured depository 
institution that the FDIC in its discretion designated an eligible entity. (See 73 Fed. 
Reg. 64181 [Oct. 29, 2008] and 73 Fed. Reg. 72266 [Nov. 26, 2008]). 
19 When the nine largest banks were informed on the afternoon of October 13 that 
they had to accept capital infusions under TARP, they were also told that they had to 
opt in to the DGP. (See Henry Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse 
of the Global Financial System [2010], 364). Several months later, one observer would 
note that while some of the largest banks eagerly sought to exit the TARP, they were 
not similarly eager to abandon the TLGP. (See Andrew Bary, “How Do You Spell Sweet 
Deal? For Banks, It’s TLGP,” Barron’s, April 20, 2009). 
14
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 1 Iss. 2
  
 
The Debt Guarantee Program 
The DGP provided liquidity by guaranteeing participating entities’ 
newly issued senior unsecured borrowing, thereby allowing 
participants to roll over maturing debt or issue additional debt. 
Ground Rules and Extensions 
The program excluded certain types of debt instruments, as it was 
specifically designed not to encourage exotic or complex funding 
structures and not to protect lenders who sought to make risky loans.20 
Generally the FDIC capped guaranteed debt issuance at 125 percent of 
an entity’s senior unsecured debt that was outstanding as of September 
30, 2008, and was scheduled to mature on or before June 30, 2009. The 
cap was set at this level to allow participants to roll over existing debt 
and have some room for their debt issuance to grow. For entities with 
no senior unsecured debt outstanding as of September 30, 2008, or 
with only federal funds outstanding, the limit was set at 2 percent of 
consolidated total liabilities as of September 30, 2008. 
As a condition of participation in the program, entities agreed to 
comply with any FDIC request that they provide relevant information 
about their debt issuances under the program. Another condition was 
that entities agreed to be subject to periodic FDIC on-site reviews (after 
the FDIC consulted with the appropriate federal banking regulator) to 
determine the entity’s compliance with the terms and requirements of 
the DGP. The FDIC also had discretion to terminate an entity’s 
continued participation in the DGP after consulting with the entity’s 
primary federal regulator.21 
Initially the DGP allowed participating entities to issue guaranteed debt 
until June 30, 2009, with the guarantee set to expire on the earlier of 
the maturity of the debt or June 30, 2012. In May 2009, however, the 
FDIC extended the program to reduce potential market disruption and 
 
20 Debt eligible for the guarantee included federal funds purchased, promissory notes, 
commercial paper, unsubordinated unsecured notes (including zero-coupon bonds), 
and certain U.S. dollar-denominated certificates of deposit. From the program’s 
inception through December 5, 2008, the DGP covered debt with a maturity of 30 days 
or less, but in response to comments on the interim rule, the FDIC excluded debt with 
a maturity of 30 days or less and focused on stable, longer-term sources of funding, 
where liquidity was most lacking. The DGP was extended in 2009 to cover mandatory 
convertible debt. (See 74 Fed. Reg. 9522 [Mar. 4, 2009]). The guarantee for such debt 
was set to expire on the earlier of the maturity of the debt, the conversion date, or 
June 30, 2012. 
21 Both the on-site review authority and the termination authority were rarely used. 
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to facilitate an orderly phase-out of the program.22 The issuance 
deadline was extended four months, to October 31, 2009, and the 
guarantee period was extended six months, expiring December 31, 
2012. Participating entities that had issued DGP debt on or before April 
1, 2009, could use the extension automatically, but others had to 
receive FDIC approval to use it. No entities that had opted out of the 
initial phase were permitted to make use of the extension. Debt 
outstanding over the course of the program is presented in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3. DGP Debt Outstanding, October 2008–December 2012 
 
Source:  FDIC
 
22 74 Fed. Reg. 26521 (Jun. 3, 2009). 
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Pricing and Limits on Participation 
To compensate for the FDIC’s risk, entities that issued debt were 
assessed fees. Initially the Corporation proposed an annualized flat-
rate 75 basis-point fee, after determining (by using credit default swap 
[CDS] spreads) that that amount would be substantially above the cost 
of “normal” credit protection but much lower than the very wide CDS 
spreads in October 2008. This proposed fee structure was the product 
of consultation with the Federal Reserve and Treasury. In response to 
industry comments, however, the FDIC altered the flat-rate fee to a 
sliding fee schedule, with fees ranging from 50 to 100 basis points, 
increasing for longer-maturity debt.23 In addition, for holding 
companies whose affiliated banks’ assets constituted less than half of 
the holding company’s consolidated assets, the FDIC increased DGP 
fees by 10 basis points. Finally, in conjunction with the program’s 
extension in May 2009, the FDIC added a surcharge to the guarantee 
fee on debt with a maturity of one year or greater issued after April 1, 
2009. The surcharge varied depending on the type of institution issuing 
the debt, with banks paying the lowest fees.24 
Some economists have suggested that the FDIC might have been better 
served by adopting a more discriminating pricing method, such as the 
market-based pricing mechanisms used by many similar European 
programs. For example, pricing for the UK program started with a flat 
base charge supplemented by an institution’s median five-year CDS 
spread in 2007, the year before the program’s implementation. One 
study, using a sample of banks in both countries (U.S. and UK), 
calculated a “fair price” for the guarantee by using an average three-
year CDS spread in November 2008, and compared the calculated fair 
price with the average UK guarantee fee and with the flat U.S. fee. The 
study found that the average UK fee was higher than the average 
 
23 An annualized fee of 50 basis points was applied to debt with a maturity of 180 days 
or less. The fees increased to 75 basis points for debt with a maturity of 181 to 364 
days, and to 100 basis points for debt with a maturity of 365 days or more. 73 Fed. 
Reg. 72244 (Nov. 26, 2008). 
24 The surcharge was intended to compensate members of the Deposit Insurance 
Fund (DIF) (including those that did not issue FDIC-guaranteed debt) for bearing the 
risk that TLGP fees would be insufficient and that, as explained in the section below 
on the TLGP’s effects and costs, a systemic risk assessment would be levied on all 
insured institutions. Unlike the initial DGP guarantee fees, which were reserved for 
possible DGP losses and segregated from the DIF, the amount of any surcharge 
collected in connection with the extended DGP was to be deposited into the DIF and 
used by the FDIC when calculating the fund’s reserve ratio. (See 74 Fed. Reg. 26521, 
26523 [Jun. 3, 2009]). For an explanation of the fund’s reserve ratio, see FDIC 2017, 
Chapter 5. 
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calculated fair price (133.7 bps vs. 109.6 bps) but that the flat U.S. fee 
was substantially lower than the calculated fair price (75 bps vs. 255.4 
bps).25 These results imply that the U.S. DGP provided a large subsidy 
to U.S. banks. A later study sought to quantify the subsidy, using a 
sample of almost $200 billion in guaranteed debt issued by six large 
U.S. entities. The study found that the six institutions saved almost $20 
billion over the life of the bonds compared with what they would have 
spent for nonguaranteed debt; in other words, they saved substantially 
more than they paid the FDIC for the guarantee.26 As mentioned above, 
when the FDIC extended the DGP for four months beyond the original 
intended expiration of the program, surcharges were added for certain 
types of guaranteed debt, not only to encourage banks to exit the 
program but also to “reduce the subsidy provided by the DGP.”27 
It is important to understand that pricing was not the only tool the FDIC 
had available to address DGP-related risks. Not all institutions were 
permitted to participate in the DGP, and the FDIC limited others’ ability 
to do so. Specifically, the rule implementing the DGP permitted the 
FDIC, working with an entity’s primary federal regulator, to make 
exceptions to the entity’s debt guarantee limit—to increase, reduce, or 
restrict in some way the entity’s ability to issue debt.28  The Corporation 
used this discretion extensively to mitigate its risk of loss from the DGP. 
In using this discretion, the FDIC and the other federal banking 
agencies developed a consultative process to review the debt limits of 
otherwise eligible entities that had adverse regulatory ratings29 or poor 
financial metrics, such as very high past-due ratios or poor 
capitalization, and in the case of several hundred weak institutions, the 
Corporation reduced to zero the amount of guaranteed debt they could 
issue. From the very start of the program, no troubled entities (those 
 
25 See V. Acharya and R. Sundaram, “The Financial Sector Bailout: Sowing the Seeds of 
the Next Crisis?” in Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, ed. V. 
Acharya and M. Richardson (2009), 327–39. The authors wrote the piece before the 
FDIC changed its pricing from 75 bps to the 50–100 bps scale depending on maturity; 
although this change would have altered their results somewhat, it would not have 
altered their conclusions. 
26 Levy and Zaghini, “The Pricing of Government-Guaranteed Bank Bonds.” The 
authors note that the total issuance was $184.9 billion, so even if all of the debt had 
incurred a fee of 100 bps, the total fee would have been less than $2 billion. 
27 74 Fed. Reg. 26523 (Jun. 3, 2009). The surcharges were also added to compensate 
DIF members (see note 24). 
28 73 Fed. Reg. 72267 (Nov. 26, 2008). 
29 The regulatory agencies rate both insured depository institutions and BHCs on a 
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the highest rating and 5 the lowest. 
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with supervisory ratings of 4 or 5) had been allowed to issue 
guaranteed debt, and soon thereafter the restriction was expanded to 
include many 3-rated entities as well as de novo banks (the latter have 
a significantly higher likelihood of failure than do established 
institutions). In all, the FDIC restricted the participation of more than 
1,600 banks and thrifts and 1,400 BHCs, or approximately 35 percent 
of banks and thrifts and 39 percent of bank holding companies and 
other eligible affiliates that had opted into the program as of year-end 
2008. 
Challenges: Payment of Claims and Legal Issues 
Of the several challenges the FDIC faced in creating the DGP, the most 
significant one was how to address the payment of claims under the 
program. Another was how to handle numerous technical details. 
Having never undertaken such a guarantee before, the Corporation was 
confronted with both a novel problem and a natural tendency to think 
in terms of its longstanding methods for handling insured deposits. As 
a result, the initial interim rule the FDIC put forward for the payment 
of claims relied for triggers on the receivership process for banks and 
on bankruptcy filings for BHCs—but neither of those adequately took 
into account the expectations of market participants for prompt 
payment.30 In addition, the issue of timely payment could have had 
serious implications for how the rating agencies treated TLGP-
guaranteed debt. 
Indeed, Euroweek described the program as having been “on the brink 
of collapse” in early November and noted that senior bankers were 
“highly dissatisfied with the scheme as it then stood and predicted 
disaster for it.”31 After the initial interim rule was published, parties 
that commented on it—including representatives of Bank of America, 
Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, 
Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo—urged that FDIC regulations provide 
that payment be made as principal and interest became due and 
 
30 Initially, the FDIC proposed two different methods for the payment of claims, one 
for insured depository institutions (IDIs), the other for BHCs. For IDIs, the FDIC 
expected to use its established receivership process, which the agency believed would 
in most cases lead to payment of claims the next business day after failure so long as 
the claim was determined to be valid. For BHCs, the FDIC stated it intended to pay 
principal plus interest to the debtholder when the BHC filed for bankruptcy, but only 
after the claim was allowed under the bankruptcy code. If the FDIC did not pay within 
one business day of the filing, the agency would pay interest on the debt at the 90-day 
Treasury bill rate in effect at the time of the filing. 73 Fed. Reg. 64184-85 (Oct. 29, 
2008). 
31 Euroweek, “FDIC Fiddling Rescues Bank Liquidity Plan,” November 28, 2008, 10. 
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payable, and they noted that if the FDIC failed to make payment as soon 
as an issuer defaulted, the demand for DGP debt would be severely 
curtailed because likely purchasers would be very concerned about 
timely receipt of scheduled payments with minimal risk exposure.32 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) stated that in order for FDIC-guaranteed debt 
“to qualify for rating substitution treatment [in other words, for FDIC-
guaranteed debt to receive the same rating as debt of the U.S. 
government], the terms of a guarantee had to be unconditional, 
irrevocable, and timely.” S&P warned, however, that the initial interim 
rule made it “uncertain whether payment of interest and principal 
under [the FDIC’s] guarantee would have to be made on a timely basis” 
and that, indeed, “there appears to be the potential for a significant 
delay in payment beyond the terms specified in the debt, even though 
ultimate repayment is expected.” S&P indicated that under the interim 
rule, guaranteed debt would “result in, at most, limited rating elevation 
for guaranteed obligations” and that unless the proposal was amended, 
“we would be unable to rate the debt of financial institutions qualifying 
for the FDIC guarantees at the ‘AAA’ rating of the U.S. government.”33 
Such an outcome would have greatly reduced the effectiveness of the 
DGP. 
The FDIC recognized the validity of the commenters’ concerns, and the 
final rule, in November 2008, incorporated changes that assured 
debtholders they would continue to receive timely payments following 
payment default without compromising the FDIC’s ability to obtain 
 
32 See, for example, the comment letter at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2008/08c39AD37.pdf. The FDIC 
sought to acquire knowledge about the debt markets, and during the week of October 
27, staff met with representatives of both S&P and Fitch to discuss their methods of 
rating debt securities. 
33 Tanya Azarchs and Scott Sprinzen, “U.S. Guarantees of Bank Debt under Interim 
Rules Do Not Promise Timely Payment,” Standard & Poor’s Ratings Direct (November 
10, 2008), 2. Quotations from this publication are reproduced with permission of 
Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC. Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC 
(S&P) does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of 
any information, including ratings, and is not responsible for any errors or omissions 
(negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, or for the results obtained from the 
use of ratings. S&P gives no express or implied warranties, including, but not limited 
to, any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose or use. S&P 
shall not be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, 
punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses 
(including lost income or profits and opportunity costs) in connection with any use 
of ratings. S&P’s ratings are statements of opinions and are not statements of fact or 
recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell securities. They do not address the 
market value of securities or the suitability of securities for investment purposes and 
should not be relied on as investment advice. 
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enough information to pay claims appropriately.34 
The trigger for the payment obligation was changed from a bank failure 
or a bankruptcy filing to a payment default.35 In addition, the FDIC’s 
satisfaction of the guarantee would be such that the agency would 
continue to make scheduled interest and principal payments under the 
terms of the debt through its maturity.36  These changes addressed the 
concerns of both the industry and the rating agencies.37 With the 
program improvements in place, eligible entities quickly responded 
and, instead of claiming that the DGP was near collapse, Euroweek 
described it as having gotten off to “a scorching start,” with several 
large U.S. banks issuing $17 billion in guaranteed debt in late November 
after having been denied access to the market for months. The 
publication continued: “Clearly the once-reviled plan [had] … been 
given a clean bill of health by the market.38 (The box below titled 
“Institutions Using the Debt Guarantee Program” provides information 
about the use of the DGP by the largest financial institutions in the 
country—the group that issued the bulk of guaranteed debt. The 
appendix lists all the issuers of $250 million or more in debt guaranteed 
under the program.) 
Another important challenge was how to address numerous legal 
issues having to do with participation in the DGP. The final rule dealt 
with these difficulties by requiring an issuing entity to execute and file 
with the FDIC a “Master Agreement” that (1) acknowledged the 
establishment of a debt to the FDIC for any payment made under the 
program and agreed to honor the FDIC’s demand for payment on the 
debt immediately; (2) arranged for the DGP debtholder (a) to assign to 
 
34 73 Fed. Reg. 72260 (Nov. 26, 2008). 
35 For the changes described here, see 73 Fed. Reg. 72263–4 (Nov. 26, 2008). 
36 For debt with final maturities beyond the DGP’s expiration, the FDIC could elect at 
any time after that date to pay all outstanding principal and interest under the debt 
issuance. 
37 For example, on November 24, Moody’s Investors Service announced that it would 
assign TLGP-guaranteed debt a rating of “Aaa,” the same rating it assigned the U.S. 
government, noting that the changes made to the program ensured timely payment 
(Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Will Assign Backed-Aaa Ratings to Debt 
Securities Covered by the FDIC’s Guarantee,” Global Credit Research, November 24, 
2008, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-will-assign-backed-Aaa-ratings-
to-debt-securities-covered--PR_167951). There remained some operational 
questions about how parties would proceed in the event of a default on DGP-
guaranteed commercial paper. These questions were settled in April 2009 by a 
Memorandum of Understanding agreed to by the FDIC, the Depository Trust Clearing 
Corporation, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the U.S. Treasury. 
38 Euroweek, “Goldman Leads TLGP Off to a Flying Start,” November 28, 2008, 9. 
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the FDIC all rights and interests in that debt upon the FDIC’s payment 
under the guarantee and (b) to release the FDIC from any further 
liability with respect to that particular debt issuance; and (3) provided 
that the issuer could elect to designate an authorized representative to 
make claims on behalf of debtholders (claimants could choose, instead, 
to file with the FDIC individually, but the existence of an authorized 
representative for a class of debtholders was expected to permit a 
much faster response to a claim). 
 
* * * 
By mid-2009, financial markets were stabilizing, and DGP issuance was 
down significantly. In October, the FDIC approved a final rule ending 
the DGP on the last day of that month (on October 31, 2009), but with 
an emergency guarantee facility available on a case-by-case basis 
through April 30, 2010.39  The emergency facility carried very high fees 
(300 basis points). In announcing the availability of the emergency 
guarantee facility, Bair stated, “It should be clear that this is not a 
continuation of the program, but an ending of the program with just a 
short-term facility that is only available for clearly unforeseen and 
unexpected events.”40 The FDIC had always intended that the program 
be temporary; the emergency facility was never used and the DGP 
ended as scheduled on October 31, 2009.  
 
39 74 Fed. Reg. 54743 (Oct. 23, 2009).0 
40 Emily Flitter, “Way Out Gets Clearer as TLGP to End,” American Banker, October 21, 
2009, 1. 
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Institutions Using the Debt Guarantee Program 
Entities using the DGP ranged from small community banks to the largest 
financial institutions in the country, with the latter group issuing the bulk of 
guaranteed debt. The largest issuer was Citigroup, including Citibank and 
eligible affiliates, which issued almost $176 billion of guaranteed debt over 
the course of the program. Among banking organizations, the second-largest 
issuer was Bank of America Corporation, including its bank and eligible 
affiliates, which issued almost $131 billion; and the next-highest issuers 
among banking organizations were JPMorgan Chase & Company, its bank 
and affiliates; Goldman Sachs Group Inc.; and Morgan Stanley. Each of the 
three issued over $30 billion in guaranteed debt. 
 
 
The second largest issuer of DGP debt overall was General Electric Capital 
Corporation (GECC), which was a savings and loan holding company by 
virtue of its indirecta ownership of GE Money Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
FDIC’s TLGP rule allowed such holding companies to participate in the DGP , 
but only if they were engaged solely in activities permissible for a financial 
holding company under section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act.b 
GECC was, however, not solely engaged in those permitted activities, and so 
instead it applied (as was also a allowed) to participate based on its status as 
an affiliate of an insured depository institution that had received the 
requisite endorsement from the appropriate federal banking regulator (in 
this case, the Office of Thrift Supervision). After some discussion between 
GECC’s parent, General Electric (GE) and the government, the FDIC approved 
the firm’s participation. The FDIC judged GECC’s capital and risk 
management to be solid, and since GE agreed to guarantee the FDIC against 
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The Transaction Account Guarantee Program: 
Purpose, Fees, and Extensions 
Under the TAGP, the FDIC provided a guarantee of all funds held in non-
interest-bearing transaction accounts at participating banks until 
December 31, 2009 (the guarantee was extended twice, first through 
June 30, 2010, and then through December 31, 2010, as discussed 
below).41 The program was intended to encourage customers to keep 
their deposits in their bank and thereby avoid runs at healthy banks. 
More particularly, the TAGP addressed the concern of bankers and 
others that, given the uncertain economic conditions, without the 
guarantee banks could lose many small-business accounts (including 
payroll accounts), which frequently exceed the insurance limit of 
$250,000.42  
 
41 The interim rule defined a qualifying account as “a transaction account with respect 
to which interest is neither accrued nor paid and on which the insured depository 
institution does not reserve the right to require advance notice of an intended 
withdrawal” (see 73 Fed. Reg., 64182 [Oct. 29, 2008]). But after receiving comments 
on the interim rule, the FDIC extended the TAGP to cover certain other types of 
deposit accounts important to sole proprietorships and charitable organizations. 
These included Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTAs) and negotiable order of 
withdrawal (NOW) accounts where the participating institution committed to 
maintaining a rate no higher than 0.5 percent; this maximum was lowered to 0.25 
percent as part of the second extension of the program. 
42 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 temporarily raised the basic 
FDIC insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000 effective October 3, 2008; Dodd-
loss, GECC’s fees would help bolster the FDIC’s reserves and offset potential 
losses in the DGP.c 
A number of U.S. bank subsidiaries of very large foreign banking 
organizations also issued guaranteed debt; these included Union Bank (the 
U.S. subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc.); HSBC Bank USA, 
National Association (the U.S. subsidiary of HSBC Holdings, PLC); and Bank 
of the West (the U.S. subsidiary of BNP Paribas). 
 
a GECC’s two bank subsidiaries (GE Money Bank and GE Capital Financial, 
Inc.) were direct, wholly owned subsidiaries of GE Consumer Finance, Inc., 
which was wholly owned by GECC. 
b 12 U.S.C. §1843(k).  
c On GECC, see Paulson, On the Brink, 373, 400; and Bair, Bull by the Horns, 
118. 
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The TAGP marked the first time the FDIC had offered deposit insurance 
above the statutory limit. In effect, the program gave institutions the 
option of purchasing deposit insurance for the otherwise uninsured 
balances of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts. In this way, 
assistance could be provided to smaller institutions that did not benefit 
from the DGP. This is not to say that larger institutions did not also 
participate in and benefit from the TAGP, for they did, but it is 
noteworthy that during the program’s extension through 2010, the 
proportional participation of banks with more than $10 billion in assets 
dropped far more than did the proportional participation of smaller 
banks. 
Like the DGP, the TAGP imposed fees for using the program. The TAGP 
initially applied a 10 basis-point annual assessment rate surcharge on 
non-interest-bearing transaction deposits and other qualifying 
accounts for amounts over $250,000; with the first extension, the fee 
was increased (see next paragraph). The total deposits covered by the 
TAGP are represented in Figure 2.4. 
The TAGP proved effective at preventing potentially disruptive shifts in 
deposit funding. As noted earlier in this section, the TAGP was intended 
to expire on December 31, 2009, but because bank failures continued 
to increase during 2009, the FDIC was concerned that terminating the 
TAGP too quickly could unnerve uninsured depositors and undo the 
progress made in restoring credit markets. Therefore, the FDIC Board 
extended the TAGP for an additional six months, through June 30, 
2010.43 As part of this extension, the surcharge was increased from a 
flat rate of 10 basis points to a risk-based rate. Participating banks paid 
an assessment rate of 15, 20, or 25 basis points, depending on the 
institution’s deposit insurance assessment category (for deposit 
insurance assessment categories, see FDIC 2017, Chapter 5). 
Institutions participating in the TAGP were allowed to opt out of the 
program effective on January 1, 2010. Over 6,400 institutions (or 93 
percent of the institutions that were participating at year-end 2009) 
elected to continue in the TAGP through June 30, 2010. 
 
Frank, in 2010, made the increase permanent. 
43 74 Fed. Reg. 45093 (Sept. 1, 2009). 
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Figure 2.4. Amounts Guaranteed by the TAGP, 2008–2010 
 
Source:  FDIC 
Even after that first extension, the lingering consequences of the 
financial crisis and recession continued to put pressure on banks’ 
earnings and asset quality. Those effects were expected to persist and 
could have had the potential to undermine banks, particularly banks 
exposed to local markets that had experienced the greatest distress. 
The FDIC was concerned that allowing the TAGP to expire in June as 
scheduled could lead to the withdrawals of large transaction accounts 
at many community banks, possibly resulting in needless liquidity 
failures of those banks or lower deposit franchise values (for a 
discussion of franchise value, see FDCI 2017, Chapter 6). The FDIC 
therefore authorized a second six-month extension, until December 31, 
2010, leaving in place the surcharges that had been imposed during the 
first extension. The Corporation left open the possibility of yet a third 
extension, but not beyond year-end 2011.44 However, passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) in July 2010 eliminated the need for such an extension, as the 
law mandated that the FDIC provide an unlimited guarantee, funded by 
the DIF, of all non-interest-bearing transaction accounts from 
December 31, 2010, through December 31, 2012.45 Thus, the TAGP 
 
44 See 75 Fed. Reg. 20247–65 (Apr. 19, 2010). 
45 For the implementation of the Dodd-Frank provisions regarding unlimited 
coverage of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, see 75 Fed. Reg. 69577 (Nov. 
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ended on December 31, 2010. 
The TLGP: Effects and Costs 
The DGP enabled financial institutions to meet their financing needs 
during a period of systemwide turmoil. At a time when banks and other 
eligible institutions were unable to roll over their debt at reasonable 
rates and terms, the DGP reopened the short- and medium-term debt 
markets by allowing participating institutions to issue an array of 
guaranteed debt instruments. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show that the eligible 
entities, after issuing mostly short-term debt (commercial paper) at the 
very beginning of the program, increasingly moved toward issuing debt 
at longer maturities. 
Figure 2.5. DGP Debt Outstanding by Type, October 2008–December 
2009 
 
Source:  FDIC
 
15, 2010). The guarantee provided under Dodd-Frank did not, however, cover IOLTAs 
or NOW accounts. On December 29, 2010, a subsequent statute amended the 
definition of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts to include IOLTAs. The FDIC 
implemented the amended definition effective January 27, 2011 (see 76 Fed. Reg. 
4813 [Jan. 27, 2011]). 
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Figure 2.6. Maturities of TLGP Debt Outstanding at Month End, October 
2008–October 2009  
 
Source:  FDIC 
Figure 2.7. Funding Costs: TLGP Debt vs. Non-Guaranteed Debt, January 
2007–October 2009  
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Specifically, the DGP lowered the cost of funding. For participating 
entities, the explicit FDIC guarantee—coming at a time when credit 
market spreads had reached record-high levels—meant that DGP debt 
was assigned an AAA/Aaa rating. That rating allowed participating 
entities to raise funds and roll over maturing debt at significantly lower 
funding costs than the entities could have obtained by issuing debt not 
guaranteed by the government (see Figure 2.7). A 2017 study found 
that DGP-guaranteed bonds “vastly improved new and pre-existing 
debt liquidity” and that the program ultimately lowered the default risk 
of the institution (as well as of the insured bond) and, in addition, 
improved the liquidity for non-guaranteed bonds issued by DGP 
participants.46 A 2013 study found that the DGP led to a drop in yield of 
AAA/Aaa financial debt near the time of the announcements of FDIC-
guaranteed debt issuance and to a general pattern of decreasing yield 
spreads over time.47 
Figure 2.8. TLGP vs. Non-TLGP Debt Issuance, October 2008–October 
2009
 
Source:  FDIC 
 
46 See Jeffrey Black et al., “Benefits of Debt Guarantees: Evidence from the FDIC Debt-
Guarantee Program” (unpublished manuscript), February 2017, 
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download. 
cgi?db_name=SWFA2017&paper_id=151. 
47 See Brent Ambrose et al., “The Financial Crisis and Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program: Their Impact on Fixed Income Markets,” Journal of Fixed Income 23, no. 2 
(2013): 5–26. 
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In the wake of the DGP, debt markets stabilized. By September 2009, 
most banks were trading in the CDS market below where they were 
before the Lehman bankruptcy, and a senior syndicate banker 
remarked, “Good progress has been made so it makes sense for the 
TLGP to be withdrawn.”48 Indeed, only a few entities had issued DGP 
debt during the period of the DGP’s extension, a period when banks and 
their holding companies successfully issued non-guaranteed debt (see 
Figure 2.8). 
Another source of funding for banks, and in particular for community 
banks, is deposits held in transaction accounts. By removing the risk of 
loss to the businesses that commonly use these accounts to meet 
payroll and to serve other purposes, the TAGP stabilized deposit 
funding for insured banks.49 In the first quarter of 2009, banks reported 
586,519 non-interest-bearing transaction accounts over $250,000 in 
value, representing an increase of 12 percent compared with the fourth 
quarter of 2008. These first-quarter 2009 deposit accounts totaled 
$855 billion, of which $700 billion was guaranteed under the TAGP. At 
the peak of the program, in December 2009, more than 5,800 FDIC-
insured institutions reported having 685,465 non-interest-bearing 
transaction accounts over $250,000 in value, with deposits totaling just 
over $1 trillion. 
* * * 
If assessments for the TLGP (counting both components) had proved 
insufficient to cover the expenses related to the program, statute would 
have required that the FDIC levy a special assessment on all insured 
depository institutions (including those that had opted out, but not 
including BHCs or nonbank institutions that had participated) to cover 
the loss.50 However, overall, TLGP fees exceeded the costs of the 
program. 
Under the DGP, 121 entities issued guaranteed debt, with the FDIC 
collecting $10.4 billion in fees and surcharges. Six entities defaulted on 
 
48 Euroweek, “FDIC Plans Phase Out of Guarantee Programme,” September 11, 2009, 
12. 
49 The TAGP also had an effect on FDIC resolutions during the crisis. In combination 
with the increased insurance coverage limit to $250,000, the TAGP greatly reduced 
the number of uninsured depositors at many failing banks. This reduction meant that 
there were many more whole bank–all deposit resolutions, as opposed to whole 
bank–insured deposit resolutions; the relative increase in whole bank–all deposit 
resolutions could have reduced the FDIC’s administrative costs. For a discussion of 
the different types of resolutions, see FDIC 2017, Chapter 6. 
50 12 U.S.C. §1823(c)(4)(G)(ii). 
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their debt, with the FDIC paying $153 million to cover the guarantee on 
those debt securities.51 The majority of the FDIC’s payments ($113 
million) stemmed from the outstanding DGP debt held by banks that 
failed in 2011. Under the TAGP, the FDIC collected $1.2 billion in fees; 
as of December 31, 2016, estimated TAGP losses from failures were 
about $1.5 billion.52  The five failures with the highest resolution costs 
attributable to the TAGP, and the relationship between those costs and 
all other resolution costs attributable to the TAGP, are presented in 
Figure 2.9. 
Figure 2.9. The Costs of the TAGP: The 5 Most Expensive Failures vs. All 
Others ($ Millions, as of December 31, 2016)  
 
Source:  FDIC 
 
51 One of these losses involved fraud. Three employees of Coastal Community 
Investments (Coastal), a holding company that owned two Florida banks that would 
fail in 2010, were sentenced in 2014 to prison terms and were required to pay more 
than $4.5 million in restitution to the FDIC. Coastal had had a $3 million secured loan 
that was in default, and failure to repay the loan could have allowed its lender to take 
over the two Florida banks. In order to repay the loan and retain control of the banks, 
the employees misrepresented the loan as unsecured, allowing Coastal to borrow 
125% of the $3 million amount and have it guaranteed under the DGP. Coastal then 
obtained a DGP-guaranteed $3.75 million loan from another bank. When Coastal later 
defaulted on this second loan, that lender filed a claim with the FDIC for the loan 
amount plus interest, and the FDIC paid the claim of just over $3.8 million. See U.S. 
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida, 
“Bankers and Attorney Sentenced to Prison, for Fraud, False Statement, and Making a 
False Claim against the United States,” Press Release (August 22, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndfl/pr/bankers-and-attorney-sentenced-prison-
fraud-false-statements-and-making-false-claim. 
52 Because these totals were generated using estimated losses on failures as of 
December 31, 2016, they differ from totals reported by the FDIC at the end of the 
TAGP (December 31, 2010). 
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Conclusion 
For the FDIC, the TLGP was extraordinary in several ways. First, during 
the Corporation’s first 75 years, it had never systematically protected 
bank debt, let alone bank holding company debt or the debt of nonbank 
holding company affiliates.53 Second, the FDIC had never extended 
unlimited deposit insurance protection to a class of bank deposits (in 
this case, a broad subset of transaction accounts), although in the past 
the principle of unlimited deposit insurance coverage had been 
considered. Third, this was only the second time that the FDIC’s Board 
approved a systemic risk exception and the first time that the 
assistance was actually put in place (assistance to Wachovia had been 
approved two weeks earlier, but the need for it was subsequently 
obviated when Wells Fargo acquired that bank [see FDCI 2017, Chapter 
3]). Fourth, creation of the TLGP involved the use by bank regulators of 
a legal interpretation of the systemic risk exception that was at the least 
novel, as was acknowledged at the time. All these extraordinary 
features reflected the precarious state of the financial services industry 
in the fall of 2008. 
The TLGP, in concert with other government programs, brought 
stability to U.S. financial markets in a time of crisis. Conditions in the 
credit markets had improved significantly by the start of 2009, and by 
midyear they began returning to normal, despite still-elevated levels of 
problem loans; interest-rate spreads had retreated from the highs 
established during the depth of the crisis, during the fall of 2008; and 
activity in interbank lending and corporate bond markets had 
increased. Banks were able to issue debt without a government 
guarantee. This stabilization of the markets was accomplished with an 
industry-funded program that not only did not damage the DIF but, 
instead, substantially benefited it. Overall, during a period when the 
banking industry and the financial markets were in crisis, the TLGP 
made an important contribution to the stability of both. Looking back 
on the program, former chairman Sheila Bair noted that “if we ever 
again get into a situation where the entire financial system is seizing 
 
53 During the 1980s, the FDIC, in the context of resolving troubled institutions, did 
protect debtholders several times. In 1984, open-bank assistance to Continental 
Illinois National Bank and Trust Company included the protection of all general 
creditors; the open-bank assistance to First Republic Bank Corporation in 1988 also 
protected all general creditors. Some bondholders were partially protected in the 
open-bank assistance to First City Bancorporation of Texas in 1988, and a year later, 
with the failure of MCorp, unsubordinated general creditors of 19 of the holding 
company’s banks were protected. See FDIC, Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC 
Experience (1998), 554, 571, 595, 622. 
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up, where even healthy and well-managed banks are having trouble 
accessing liquidity, I do think this is a good model to use.”54 
In several important ways, Dodd-Frank refined the range of actions 
that would be available for responding to future crises of the financial 
system, and did so essentially by limiting regulatory discretion should 
another crisis arise.55 In particular, the act repealed the use of a 
systemic risk exception to assist a troubled open individual institution; 
and although Title XI does permit the creation of a program similar to 
the DGP, it also imposes restrictions on such a program.56 Dodd-Frank 
prohibits the creation of a future TAGP.57 
Title XI explicitly authorizes a “liquidity event determination.”58 The 
process of determining the existence of a liquidity event is similar to 
the process set forth in FDICIA for declaring a systemic risk exception: 
if the FDIC Board and the FRB determine that a liquidity event exists 
and that failure to act would significantly affect financial stability, and 
if the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the President 
concurs, the FDIC has the authority to create “a widely available 
program” to guarantee obligations of solvent insured banks or their 
holding companies (including holding company affiliates). 
But although the FDIC will be responsible for administering such a 
program, the maximum amount of outstanding debt that can be 
guaranteed is to be determined not by the FDIC but by the Secretary of 
the Treasury in consultation with the President. And, in a significant 
 
54 Joe Adler, “FDIC Debt Program Proves as Good as TARP, without the Baggage,” 
American Banker, April 26, 2012. 
55 See Martin Neil Baily and Aaron Klein, “The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on 
Financial Stability and Economic Growth,” Presentation at University of Michigan 
Center on Finance, Law, and Policy, October 24, 2014, 
https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-impact-of-the-dodd-frank-act-on-
financial-stability-and-economic-growth/; and James Broughel, “Title XI: Fed 
Transparency and Bailouts,” in Dodd-Frank: What It Does and Why It’s Flawed, ed. 
Hester Peirce and James Broughel (2012), 121–35, https://www. 
mercatus.org/system/files/dodd-frank-FINAL.pdf. 
56 For the limits on the use of the systemic risk exception, see Dodd-Frank, §1106 [12 
U.S.C 1823(c)(4)(G)(i)]; for the provisions allowing for a future DGP, see Dodd-Frank 
§1104–5 [12 U.S.C. 5611–12]. 
57 The law states that “a guarantee of deposits held by insured depository institutions 
shall not be treated as a debt guarantee program” under the provisions of the liquidity 
event determination (defined in note 58). See 12 U.S.C. 5612(f). 
58 The law defines a liquidity event as “an exceptional and broad reduction in the 
general ability of financial market participants … to sell financial assets without an 
unusual and significant discount or to borrow using financial assets as collateral 
without an unusual and significant increase in margin, or an unusual and significant 
reduction in the ability of financial market participants to obtain unsecured credit.” 
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addition, the law also requires the program to have congressional 
approval in the form of a joint resolution—a requirement that 
essentially means Congress must pass the equivalent of a law before 
the program can go forward.59 So although Dodd-Frank provides for a 
program similar to the DGP, the law’s requirement for wider political 
consent through congressional approval (even though the approval 
would have to be considered on an expedited basis) could limit 
regulators’ flexibility during a future financial crisis. 
 
 
59 Like a bill, a joint resolution requires the approval of both the House and the Senate 
in identical form, and requires the President’s signature to become law 
(https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/ leg_laws_acts.htm). 
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Appendix 
Table 2.A. Issuers of $250 Million or More in FDIC-Guaranteed Debt 
  
Entity 
Breakdown by Affiliate 
(if applicable) 
 
Amount 
 
Issuances 
1 Citigroup, Inc. TOTAL $175,903,888,595 1,655 
  Citigroup, Inc. $13,850,000,000 5 
  Citigroup Funding Inc. $128,997,377,222 1,165 
  Citibank, National Association $33,056,511,373 485 
2 General Electric 
Capital 
TOTAL $130,850,166,935 4,328 
 Corporation    
3 Bank of America TOTAL $130,842,662,031 1,454 
 Corporation Bank of America Corporation $64,079,465,128 1,091 
  Bank of America, National Association $46,976,837,903 281 
  Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. $19,786,359,000 82 
4 JPMorgan Chase TOTAL $42,512,382,326 189 
 & Co. JPMorgan Chase & Co. $40,534,011,955 61 
  JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
National Association 
$1,978,370,371 128 
5 Goldman Sachs 
Group, 
TOTAL $37,652,426,455 346 
 Inc.    
6 Morgan Stanley TOTAL $30,256,932,941 57 
7 Wells Fargo & 
Company 
TOTAL $10,022,320,776 107 
  Wells Fargo & Company $9,500,000,000 4 
  Wells Fargo Bank, National Association $250,868,606 14 
  Wachovia Bank, National Association $271,452,170 89 
8 GMAC LLC TOTAL $7,400,000,000 3 
9 U.S. Bancorp TOTAL $7,283,744,203 581 
  U.S. Bank National Association $4,282,285,453 467 
  U.S. Bancorp $3,001,458,750 114 
10 American Express TOTAL $5,900,000,000 3 
 Bank, FSB.    
11 State Street 
Corporation 
TOTAL $5,289,431,500 53 
  State Street Corporation $2,839,431,500 51 
  State Street Bank and Trust Company $2,450,000,000 2 
12 John Deere Capital TOTAL $4,913,503,000 116 
 Corporation    
13 HSBC USA Inc. TOTAL $4,742,598,079 24 
 (subsidiary of HSBC HSBC USA Inc. $4,616,910,000 17 
 Holdings, PLC) HSBC Bank USA, National Association $125,688,079 7 
14 Regions Bank TOTAL $4,200,000,000 6 
    continued 
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Entity 
Breakdown by 
Affiliate (if 
applicable) 
 
Amount 
 
Issuances 
15 PNC Funding Corp. TOTAL $3,900,000,000 4 
16 SunTrust Banks, Inc. TOTAL $3,576,000,000 3 
  SunTrust Bank $3,000,000,000 2 
  SunTrust Banks, Inc. $576,000,000 1 
17 Union Bank, National TOTAL $2,210,000,000 13 
 Association    
18 KeyCorp TOTAL $1,937,500,000 4 
  KeyBank National Association $1,000,000,000 1 
  KeyCorp $937,500,000 3 
19 Sovereign TOTAL $1,600,000,000 2 
 Bancorp, Inc. Sovereign Bank $1,350,000,000 1 
  Sovereign Bancorp, Inc. $250,000,000 1 
20 The Bank of New York TOTAL $1,040,412,845 73 
 Mellon Corporation The Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation 
$603,448,298 2 
  The Bank of New York Mellon $436,964,547 71 
21 Bank of the West TOTAL $1,002,889,124 2 
22 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya TOTAL $686,440,926 31 
 Argentaria Puerto 
Rico 
   
23 New York 
Community 
TOTAL $602,000,000 2 
 Bancorp, Inc. New York Community Bank $512,000,000 1 
  New York Community Bancorp, Inc. $90,000,000 1 
24 The Huntington TOTAL $600,000,000 1 
 National Bank    
25 Wilmington Trust TOTAL $460,000,000 11 
 Company    
26 MetLife, Inc. TOTAL $397,436,000 1 
27 Associated Bank, TOTAL $395,000,000 6 
 National Association    
28 Fifth Third Bancorp TOTAL $285,500,000 4 
  Fifth Third Bank $285,000,000 3 
  Fifth Third Bancorp $500,000 1 
29 Zions Bancorporation TOTAL $254,892,500 1 
 
Note: The data presented in this table account for 99.7 percent of the debt issued under the DGP. Data on 
the remaining issuers can be found at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/total_debt.html. 
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